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1. Introduction
5The ultimatum game is a division game of a fixed sum between two players. One player
offers the other a proportion of the total sum and the other either accepts it, in which
case the sum is allocated between the players in the proportion offered; or rejects it and
neither player gets anything. In its pure form the game is played only once and there is
thus no bargaining. The subgame-perfect equilibrium to the game where the players are
rational and only care about their monetary reward, is for the proposer to offer the
smallest proportion of the total pie consistent with the unit of account and for the
potential recipient to accept (Rubenstein (1982) and Stahl (1972)). The first
experimental evidence is attributed to Guth et al (1982) which found that offers were
much closer to a proportion of 50% than the theory predicts. The survey by Thaler
(1988) also concludes that the experimental evidence is not in accord with non-
cooperative-game-theory predictions when preferences are defined without
incorporating some notion of fairness in transactions. Using an experiment with a
fictitious pie to be divided, Ortona (1991) provides conflicting evidence. Potential
recipients who identified the independent-utility rational agent's decision still did not
make this decision, but exhibited behavior consistent with some non-independence of
utility. Proposers who apparently understood the game did seem to offer a lower
amount than those whose understanding was weaker. Overall, while a small proportion
of proposers seem to make very small offers, a significant proportion make offers of
close to 50% of the total pie.
Two central potential explanations for the departures of experimental outcomes from
game theoretic predictions are that the proposer is concerned about fairness, and that
the proposer has beliefs about matters which may include the possibility of the offer
6being rejected, the possibility of future experiments and other player interactions, and
beliefs about the nature of the game as represented by the experiment.
Fairness may explain the experimental results directly. Bolton (1991) develops the
Ochs and Roth (1989) suggestion of interacting utility functions, and proposes a model
in which distributional considerations appear in the bargainers' objective functions. If
fairness is defined to be the situation where agents gain welfare from their own payoff
and lose welfare from unequal shares of the pie, then the greater the weight placed on
fairness, the greater the offer. Rabin (1993) argues that fairness goes further than
altruism, in that it entails preferences in which, based on their beliefs, “People like to
help others who are helping them and to hurt those who are hurting them”. He calls the
equilibria of games that entail these preferences and beliefs “fairness equilibria” and
shows that they lead to outcomes that are consonant with the experimental  evidence
that suggests offers are larger than those that result from standard ultimatum games.
However, interdependence need not be attributed to fairness. It may be that the
ultimatum game played by participants for small stakes, as in experiments, should be
viewed as a subgame of a wider actual game among participants. Where reputation
matters for the larger game, it may be rational for players to not reveal their selfishness
or type in this subgame and hence, in particular experiments, appear as though they
support some concept of fairness. While appearing to be fair in a game with low pay-
offs may not improve one’s reputation, appearing to be selfish may have strong
negative repercussions in the larger game.
7Hoffman et al  (1994) stress the second explanation of the experimental data: the role
of beliefs. First there is the perception of the proposer that the potential recipient may
care about some aspect of the transaction separately from the income gained; as would
be the case if reputation in a wider game matters. If the game is among a cohort of
students, for example, the experimental game is of small importance relative to the
lifetime games that take place among members of the cohort. Secondly, experimental
design may carry with it the generation of expectations about a variety of other factors:
examples include the possibilities of future experimental games and that the
experimenter is, in fact, examining fairness. Hoffman et al (1994) suggest that these
beliefs are important. They find that offers are much more in agreement  with standard
theory when the experimental subjects are anonymous and they know that the
anonymous experimenter cannot link answers to subjects.
The two explanations of the data are fundamentally different. In the presence of fairness
the proposer's utility function gives some weight to the other player's welfare and more
than a minimal offer will be made irrespective of the second player's preferences. In
contrast, if it is beliefs which are operative an proposer with no interest in fairness may
nevertheless make a considerable offer.
In this paper we propose a game in which players are selfish and explore the role of
beliefs about other players in determining the offer. Expectations are formed via a
probability distribution over the magnitude of a rivalry parameter in the utility function
of the players. The use of rivalry means that fairness is explicitly ruled out:
emphasizing that it is solely beliefs that can be the source of larger than minimal offers.
8Whether rivalry is more appropriate than fairness will depend upon one's hypothesis
about agent preferences. If utility functions are to be interdependent there would seem
to be as much a place for a relative income concept, such as rivalry, as for fairness. The
agents may or may not be rivalrous in our model, but the proposer, even if not
rivalrous, is concerned about the rivalry parameter of the person with veto power. Thus,
the rational proposer forms expectations about the possibility of rejection of any offer,
given the population distribution of the rivalry parameter. The proposer trades off the
low cost of a low offer, against the higher probability of rejection of a low offer. The
person with veto power confronts no uncertainty at all: the accept/reject decision is
made after the offer is disclosed.
The game is most interesting if the two players are drawn from the same population,
and if there is a finite probability that the proposer's utility function has no
interdependence with the other player’s utility function. We characterize optimal
solutions in terms of the parameters of the distribution function, and the utility function
of the proposer. We conclude that for a wide class of parameter values it will be
rational for some proposers to choose a zero or minimal offer, and for others to choose
an offer close to 50% of the pie. The offer decreases with the proportion of the
population which care only about their own wealth, and over this parameter set there is
a discontinuity. Given this proportion and a random drawing of agents there may exist
proposers who will offer zero and others who offer as much as 40%, say, but none who
place offers in the intermediate range (0,40%). Even under risk neutrality the model
offers a rich explanation of empirical findings. We also show that a risk averse
9extension of our model exhibits the same qualities, and that more risk averse players
will make larger offers.
We conclude the paper by examining the implications of uncertainty about the size of
the pie and link this to experimental findings. A modification of our approach yields a
dictator game model that explains experimental findings of this game well.
In the next section we set out the risk-neutral case, and in Section 3 we examine the
situation where the players are risk averse. In the fourth section we describe the nature
of the optimal offer from the proposer's perspective, and in the final section we review
the implications of different information and game structures. In particular separate
cases, uncertainty about the size of the pie is incorporated, and the model is developed
for the dictator game: in both cases theory is linked to experimental  findings.
2. The risk neutral game
Consider the following game involving two players and $10. First, player 1 chooses a
number, y ∈ [0, 10] which is the proposed payoff to Player 2 (for analytical
convenience we will consider all real numbers from zero to ten). Player 2 then
announces either yes or no. The payoffs to the players are then given by the following
figure, where (x, y) are the payoffs to Players 1 and 2 respectively: (Figure 1)
Assumption 1. The game is common knowledge amongst the two players.
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Now, individual rationality and independent utilities would seem to imply that Player 2
will say yes to any offer, y > 0, and will be indifferent between yes and no for y = 0.
Hence, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the game is {y = 0, yes}.1  In
particular, this equilibrium should be independent of the total amount of cash
distributed (in this case $10 ) and whether Player 2 knows this number or not. However,
as we have indicated, experimental evidence would seem to suggest that Player 1 does
not generally offer y = 0, or even y = ε, where ε is the smallest positive monetary unit
available (for example, if the $10 is represented by 10 one dollar notes, then ε = $1). In
fact, it would appear that on many occasions Player 1's offer is closer to y = 5 than y =
0. We explain this empirical observation by arguing that Player 2's knowledge of the
total amount to be distributed introduces the feasibility of making decisions on the basis
of rivalry where players covet their own share and its excess over the remainder; if y is
too low Player 2 will say no, and Player 1 knows this. The expected cost to Player 1 of
a potential rejection will affect the offer. Neither player may actually covet the share the
other person gets, but the possibility of Player 2 gaining welfare from rivalry may be
sufficient to induce Player 1 to offer more than ε.
Assumption 2 (risk neutrality and rivalry). Let x and y be the payoffs to Players 1 and 
2 respectively. Utility functions for the two players are then given by:
U1 = x + a·[x - y], and U2 = y + b·[y - x],
where {a  ≥ 0, b ≥ 0} capture the players' attitudes towards the distribution of
the
total payoff.
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These preferences are interdependent in that they admit transaction rivalry. Each player
gains welfare from their own payoff and its excess over the other player's payoff from
the game. This specification could arise from a form of the relative income hypothesis
in which agents care about their gain from transactions and its relationship to that of the
persons they deal with. The case where there is a direct concern for fairness may be
represented by {a  ≤ 0, b ≤ 0} in which case player 1 may offer much more than y = 0;
but we do not analyze this case. Because the game concerns additions to each player's
wealth, actual player-wealth can enter as a constant or in the determination of {a, b}
without affecting the analysis which follows.
Assumption 3. Player 1 cannot observe b. However, Player 1 knows that b is drawn
randomly from a population characterized by  Prob[b < 0] = 0, and
Prob[b ≤ b'] = 1 - c·e-b'd, ∀ b' > 0, where c ∈ [0, 1], and  d > 0.
Assumption 3 admits the possibility that both agents are drawn from the same
population. The drawings are assumed to be independent so that distribution of Player 2
preference parameters, b, is unaffected by the proposer’s preference parameter a. Under
this interpretation, Prob[b = 0] = 1 - c represents the proportion of the population who
do not care about the income of others. The parameter d determines the distribution of
the parameter b  > 0 over the remainder of the population. This specification of the
cumulative density function allows characterization of equilibria in terms of
comprehensible parameters of this function. Now, Player 2 will accept the offer y if and
only if   y + b·[y - x]  ≥ 0, that is, if and only if b ≤ b(y), where
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y
10 - 2·y  ≡ b(y). (1.1)
Hence, for y ∈ [0, 5), this critical value of b is a differentiable monotonic increasing
function of y. Equivalently, Player 1 can choose a probability of acceptance - a value of
b - and then calculate the value of the offer
y(b) =  
10·b
1 + 2·b . (1.2)
that will achieve this probability .
Drawing on (1.1), the probability of Player 2 saying yes is [1 - c·e-bd], and so the
expected utility of Player 1 can be expressed as a function of this critical value of b:
EU1 = F[a, b, c, d] ≡ g[a, b]·[1 - c·e-bd],
where, from (1.1), g[a, b] ≡ x + a·[x - y] =   
10·[1 + a + b]
1 + 2·b  .
Player 1, after observing [a, c, d], will choose b ∈ [0, ∞) to maximize F[a, b, c, d]. Let
b*[ a, c, d]  (and equivalently, y*[ a, c, d] ) be the solution to this problem, then the
existence  of the solution is guaranteed  by:
Proposition 1. Given that Assumptions 1-3 hold and the population parameters     
[c, d], y*[a, c, d] is a continuous non-increasing function of a, except for a 
critical value of a  when y*[·] is non-unique ( and so not a function).
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The proof of this and subsequent propositions are relegated to the Appendix 1. They are
established in terms of the optimal b*[a, c, d], and the statement of the lemmas uses
(1.2) to translate them to the optimal offer, y*[a, c, d]. The lemma justifies the general
proposition that Player 1’s placing increasing weight on her reward relative to that of
Player 2 - that is, increasing a - will not engender larger offers. Before commenting on
the solution relative to parameter subsets we establish further properties of the optimal
offer.
 Proposition 2. Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold, then given the population parameter  
d, and Player 1's rivalry parameter, a, y*[a, c, d] is a continuous non-decreasing 
function of c, except for a critical value of c when y*[a, c, d] is non-unique (and
so not a function).
Thus where the optimal offer is a function it is nondecreasing in the proportion of the
population which does care about the payment the other player receives. The parameter
space that yields the discontinuity  is specified in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Given Assumptions 1-3 and the parameter  a, then
(i) if d < 
2
1 + a ,  ∃ c yielding a discontinuity for y*[a, c, d], while for
d ≥  
2
1 + a , y*[a, c, d] is a continuous function of c,
(ii)  if d < 
2
1 + a ,  ∃ [c", c'], with 1 > c' > c", such that for c ∈ (c", c'), ∃ b > 0 
yielding  Fb[a, b, c, d] = 0  and  Fbb[a, b, c, d] > 0.
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If the probability mass of the distribution function over positive rivalry parameters -
that is, p(0 < b ≤ b') for all b' - is sufficiently small and Player 1's rivalry parameter is
small then the turning point at a positive offer will in fact minimize expected utility.
To describe the offers more precisely we need
Proposition 4: For any given values of [ a, c, d] the expected utility of Player 1, 
EU=F(a,b,c,d), has at most one local maximum b ∈ (0,∞).
and its
Corollary: If there exists some b*>0 such that F(a,.,c,d) has a local maximum at b*, 
and if F(a,0,c,d) = F(a,b*,c,d) then the pair {0, b*} are the only global maxima
of F(a,.,c,d).
that follows immediately. Our establishment of the reported graphs of the offers use the
following
Proposition 5: Given any d < 2, there exists a nonempty set  (c2 (d),c1(d)) and an 
a* such that for every c ∈ (c2(d), c1(d))  F(a*,.,c,d) has, exactly two global 
maxima {0, b* > 0}.
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A situation with a nonunique optimal offer { y*=0, y*>0 } is described in Figure 1. It
illustrates the unique a, given {c,d}, such that Player 1 will be indifferent between
offering nothing and a positive amount. For any {c,d} there is an a such that the optimal
offer of Player 1 is not unique. It is a consequence of the tradeoff between offering an
amount that has a high probability of acceptance and her preference for a large share of
the pie. Even when her preference is over x only (a=0.0), she is concerned about
whether or not the offer will be acceptable and hence may make a positive offer. For
certain configurations of {c,d} she will be indifferent between making a positive offer
or a zero offer.
Because both players are drawn from the same distribution we can calculate the
proportion of zero offers that would be observed in a large number of games played by
players drawn from this distribution. In the case of Figure 2, those proposers with a ≥
a*= .8227 will offer zero. The proportion of zero offers is then p(y*=0) =  1-F(.8227) =
0.45. The proportion making positive offers will be 0.55.  (Figure 2)
Prior to a more detailed characterization  of the optimal offer we relax the assumption
that agents are risk neutral.
3 Risk Aversion
Consider the case where the players are risk averse and the form of the distribution
function is that specified above. We assign the utility functions:
16
Player 1: U1 = U[x + a·(x - y), q]
Player 2: U2 = U[y + b·(y - x), q*].
Again, the probability that b ≤ b' is given by 1 - c·e-b'd, where c ∈ (0, 1], and d > 0. The
variable q (and q*) is a scale of risk aversion. The closer q (q*) is to 1, the more risk-
neutral Player 1 (Player 2) becomes. Each player is drawn from an identical joint
distribution of b (a) and q (q*) the cumulative marginal distribution for b being F(b) = 1
- c·e-b'd as formerly.
Assumption 4. U: R x (0, 1) → R is C2 and satisfies the following conditions:
(i)   U[0, q] = 0, ∀ q. U[w, q] → w as q → 1,
(ii)  U1[w, q] > 0, U11[w, q] < 0, ∀ (w, q),
(iii) [w - 5]·{U1[w, q]2 - U11[w, q]·U[w, q]} < U1[w, q]·U[w, q], ∀ (w, q),
and
(iv) U1[w, q]·U2[w, q] < U12[w, q]·U[w, q], ∀ (w, q).
This assumption specifies sufficient restrictions on preferences for the results which
follow: they can be relaxed. Assumptions 4(i) and 4(ii) are standard, and assumption
4(iii) is implied by sufficiently large relative risk aversion, but assumption 4(iv) has a
weaker behavioural interpretation.2 To illustrate the assumptions, we point out that
while the constant absolute risk aversion utility function does not meet Assumption 4,
but the utility function U[y + b·(y - x), q] = [y + b·(y - x)]q does satisfy it.
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The problem for Player 1, with parameters (a, q) is to choose b ≥ 0, in order to
maximize the expected utility
F[a, b, c, d, q] ≡ U[g(a, b), q]·[1 - c·e-bd],
where, again, g(a, b) ≡   
10·[1 + a + b]
1 + 2·b  . This definition of g(.) follows from the fact that
there is no uncertainty confronting Player 2. He knows Player 1's offer and his own (b,
q*); thus he will accept  any offer which satisfies (1.1).
The basis of the following proposition is established in the Appendix 1 and by the
application of (1.2).
Proposition 6: If c >  
4 - d
4 + d , then y*[a, c, d, q] > 0  is a well-defined function.  
Further, it is non-increasing  in both a and q. For these population parameters, 
y*[·] is non-decreasing  in c, although  not necessarily monotonic in d.
This proposition characterizes the optimal offer y*, over a subset of the domain of that
function. Over this subset the optimal offer has the same qualitative properties
irrespective of the presence of risk aversion.
18
4 The Optimal Offer
The optimal offer entails trading off the reduction in utility associated with paying
Player 2 more upon acceptance, and the concomitant increase in the probability that the
offer will be accepted. The optimal offer will depend upon {c,d} and the rivalry
parameter of the proposer. For low enough c this offer will be zero, but it will increase
if c is increased sufficiently.3 While the offer may increase smoothly from zero, there is
a finite set of {a,c,d} such that increases in c have no effect on the optimal offer (of
zero) until a certain point when there is a multiple solution (zero and a much larger
offer). Beyond this point the offer switches from zero to a significant offer (as large as
40% - 50% of the pie) as the proportion of persons who covet the excess of their gain
over that of the other person, c, increases.
To illustrate this process we present diagrams of the expected utility of Player 1, the
proposer, when U[x + a·(x - y), q] = [x + a·(x - y)]q. We assume that d=1 and that the
proposer’s welfare is not affected by that of Player 2, that is, a=0, and we graph the
objective function for various levels of risk aversion, q. Expected utility is plotted for
offers less than 5 because it approaches minus infinity as y approaches  5. Since low q
represents strong risk aversion, Figure 3 illustrates that  over the range of c's graphed
the optimal offer is just below 50%.
In Figure 4 the level of risk aversion is less than that of Figure 3. The change has left
the qualitative nature of the optimal choice the same, but for low values of c the extra
welfare from making the optimal choice is small compared to the significantly risk-
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averse case of Figure 3. The nature of the change continues when moving to Figure 5
where Player 1 is mildly risk averse. We see that at this mild level of risk aversion, for
low values of c y*=0 will be chosen, and that for higher values of c offers close to 5
will be made.
Thus, generally higher risk aversion leads to higher offers. This is intuitively plausible
in that as risk aversion increases, the marginal utility of wealth declines; altering the
balance between the decrement in utility from an increased offer, and the increment in
the probability of acceptance from a higher offer. The effect of this for increased risk
aversion, as we have defined it, is to predicate higher offers. (Figures 3, 4, & 5).
5. Enriching the Information Structure: Theory and Experiment
The expanding literature about the ultimatum game is focussed on explaining
experimental results by the information structure of the game and the concomitant
perceptions of the players. Variations such as creating uncertainty about the size of the
pie (Straub and Murnighan (1995)), changing the amount and type of information of the
responder (Croson 1996)) have been used to elucidate the perceptions of players and
their responses.
In addition, the dictator game has been used to examine the role of the experimental
setting in affecting experimental outcomes (Hoffman et al (1994), Hoffman et al
(1996)). For this purpose it possesses the advantage over the ultimatum game of
eliminating strategic behaviour from the game itself. In this game the dictator decides
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(dictates) the share of the pie and the second player has no say in whether or not the
share transfer is implemented, but does receive the residual.
These two parallel experimental approaches of changing the information structure of
the game in various ways and eliminating strategic behavior by using the dictator game
are leading to advances in our comprehension of experimental results. However, there
remains a need to link experimental outcomes to theoretical frameworks.
In this section we first review additional results from our model about what might occur
when the size of the pie is uncertain, and link these to the experimental literature. We
then re-cast our model to capture the essence of the dictator game. In both cases we
show that our models have explanatory power for reported experimental results.
Uncertainty and the Ultimatum Game:  We use our model to explore the implications
of uncertainty about the size of the pie that is to be shared. Despite the simplicity of the
ultimatum game there is a set of rich information structures that we can consider. We
summarize the games and selective predictions below, under risk neutrality and where
Player 2 knows the distribution from which the size of the pie is taken. The basis for the
analysis is set out in Appendix 2.
1. Common Information. Both players know the distribution of an uncertain pie but
neither player knows the realized value until the game is over: thus Player 1’s offer
reveals no information. In this game the offer is bounded above by the smallest
feasible pie.
2. Private Information but no updating. Player 1 is told the pie size but Player 2 does
not use the offer to update his assessment of the size. This can be viewed as a case
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of unsophisticated play, or a game of bounded rationality whereby it does not pay
Player 2 to carry out the updating calculus. In this game, for any Player 1, a
lowering of the mean of the distribution will lower the optimal offer.
3. Private Information with the choice of revelation. Player 1 observes the size of the
pie and has the option of revealing this value to Player 2. In this case Player 1
always reveals, and hence the game is the one of common knowledge that forms our
basic model.
4. Private Information with updating. When Player 1 sees the size of the pie and then
announces her offer, Player 2 uses this information to update his prior (conditional
probability) as to the size of the pie. In the case where the pie can take on one of
only two values we report an example where two equilibria occur.
5. Private Information with updating: a mean preserving spread. Here we expand the
previous example by instituting a mean preserving spread to the uncertain size of
the pie. For the case of one of the equilibria we show that the effect of an increase
in uncertainty on the probability of a zero offer depends upon how this uncertainty
increase is achieved. While an increase in uncertainty raises the probability of zero
offers in a range of circumstances, where the change results from a decrease in the
lower pie size and a decrease in the probability of its occurrence (i.e. an increase in
the probability of the high pie level) the change in probability can dominate
decision making over that of the lower-bound pie size and result in higher zero-
offer probabilities.
Certain of these games have structures that are quite close to those reported for some
experimental games. For example, the question posed in the experiment of Croson
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(1996) is similar to that of Case 2.4 Croson’s (1996) lowering of the mean of the
distribution of the pie yields reduced average-offer outcomes that are qualitatively in
agreement with case 2 of our model.
Case 5 can be related to Straub and Murnighan (1995, 361) who conclude on the basis
of experimental evidence that  people will accept very low ultimatum offers when they
do not know how much is being divided. Their comparison is to compare choice under
uncertainty and certainty. In case 5 we show that this response to an increase in
uncertainty is also a prediction of our model when uncertainty is increased but that it
may not always occur: the outcomes may be sensitive to the specification of changed
uncertainty.5
Another characteristic of our model that was explored was increased uncertainty about
the respondent’s preference parameter. However, it has no experimental counterpart
and hence we do not report it.6
The Dictator Game:  Hoffman et al (1994) and Hoffman et al (1996) conduct
experiments with the dictator game. Their results mesh very tightly with those of this
paper in two ways. Firstly, the dictator experiments that are designed to effect complete
anonymity of the players and the experimenter yield predictions which are much closer
to those of games with self-contained selfish players, than does this game when the
experimenter is not anonymous. Increases in anonymity reduce the role of expectations
in the game.
The second and striking finding with respect to these dictator game experiments is that
many of them exhibit offer distributions with bi-modal tendencies (see Hoffman et al
(1994) and Hoffman et al (1996), for example); some strongly. Although this game
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does not entail strategy, using our result that expected utility may generate a bi-modal
distribution (albeit in the ultimatum game), the dictator game results do suggest that the
agents were forming expectations about some aspect of the game structure. In our
ultimatum game model a bi-modal offer distribution will arise for a particular trade-off
between the reduction in utility yielded by an increment in the offer and the
concomitant increase in the probability of acceptance.7 We show below how these
conclusions are confirmed in a our model appropriately modified for the dictator game.
Hoffman et al (1996) go on to conduct dictator game experiments that place increasing
social distance between the paired subjects.8 If the decision making agent is led to
believe that the other agent is from the same community, and hence that future
interaction may occur, that agent makes a higher offer.9 In the case of experiments
conducted with a cohort of university students, for example, there is likely to be some
probability of (potential) future transactions between them, and the reputation for
opportunistic behavior signaled in the dictator game may affect the outcome of the
dictator game. From another point of view, if there is any possibility of future
interaction, experimental dictator games offer a low-cost way of signaling one’s
reputation for opportunism. For this to be an important factor, there is no need for, in
future transactions, respondents of past games to be precisely matched with the
proposers: information that one party participated in the dictator game as proposer may
affect behavior depending upon the experience of the respondent.
In sum, bi-modal share (offer) outcomes appear in the dictator game experiments, and
the socially more distant dictators are from residual recipients, the higher is the share
that the dictator takes. We now modify our model to one which precisely captures the
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dictator game, but which allows for the possibility of future interaction with the
residual recipient.
At the date the dictator game is played, first Player 1 must share a pie, of size A, by
offering Player 2 an amount y. Second, Player 2 then says either content or not-content
(rather than accept or not-accept as in the ultimatum game). Player 2 is content if and
only if his welfare,
U2 = y + b·[y - x] ≥ 0.
To ensure that Player 2 tells the truth we assume that there is a small cost, ε > 0, to
lying.
Finally, if Player 2 says content then Player 1 receives an amount, z, while if she says
not-content  Player 1 receives 0 (z is destroyed). As z is not contestable it does not enter
into Player 2’s utility function. That is, Player 2 is happy for Player 1 to receive z if and
only if she is content. If he feels that he has been treated badly by Player 1 (and so he
says not-content), and he can punish Player 1 - at no cost to himself - then he will do so.
Yet another view of this arrangement is that as a result of having been the residual
recipient, Player 2’s assessment of Player 1’s potential opportunism is determined by
whether or not he was content. If Player 1 is deemed to be opportunistic under this
criterion then Player 2’s (bargaining) response is such that Player 1 expects to lose z in
a future transaction. Thus, total welfare for Player 1 includes expected future gains, z, if
Player 2 is content, and 0 otherwise. The amount z is the (present value of) an expected
payoff in the future that would result from a future potential meeting/transaction
between proposer and a contented responder.10
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Now Player 2 is content with the offer, y, if and only if U2 = [1 + b]·y - b·[A - y] ≥ 0, or
b ≤ y·[A - 2·y]-1, where A is the total size of the pie, and hence this becomes the
criterion for whether Player 2 is content and Player 1 can expect to get z. The welfare of
Player 1 is thus the expected  payoff
U1 = [1 + a]·A - [1 + 2·a]·y + z·{1 - c·e-dy/[A-2y]}
and an example is graphed in Figure 6 for various values of z.  (Figure 6)
The graphs of Figure 6 show that as the expected payoff from a future interaction grows
the optimal offer switches from zero to one that is close to half the pie. Thus there exist
parameters of our model that will yield the bi-modal distributions observed in dictator
game experiments. In parallel with the ultimatum game, they arise in the trade-off
between decreased utility at the time of the game and the increased probability of future
positive welfare that occurs when the share taken by the dictator is decreased.
An increase in z can take place because either the actual payoff has increased or
because the probability of future interaction between the players has increased. A
decrease in z would occur with increasing social distance between the players; it lowers
the likelihood of their transacting in the future, and it draws lower shares for the
residual recipient.
These results proffer theoretical confirmation of the experimental findings of Hoffman
et al (1996) that behavior is selfish but affected by the extent to which the other agent is
thought to be from the same community. Expectations and inference, rather than
fairness, play a critical role in determining the outcome of the game.
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In the ultimatum game, responding subjects may cite “unfairness” of the offer as the
explanation for why they did not accept it. Even if this accurately depicts the
respondent’s view, it need not mean that this person expects all players to be altruistic.
The term “unfair” could be applied to unfulfilled rivalistic expectations.
In more general settings where evolutionary change is possible, populations of altruistic
agents can be invaded by self-interested agents who succeed at the expense of altruistic
agents. Games with populations of altruistic agents have to explain why the outcomes
represent long term equilibria in the presence of evolution. Our rivalrous agents resist
invasion and yet can make generous offers.
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Appendix 1: Propositions
(i) Proposition 1
Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Given the population parameters, [c, d], y*[a, c,
d] is a continuous non-increasing function of a, except for a critical value of a  when
y*[·] is non-unique ( and so not a function).
Proof: Let
            a[b, d] ≡   
1 + b·d·[1 + b] - ebd
ebd - [1 + b·d]
 , c[b, d] ≡ 
1 + b·d·[1 + 2·b] - ebd
e-bd + b·d·[1 + 2·b] - 1
  
and c[d; a[b, d] = 0] ≡ c[b, d] when b is a function of d defined by  a[b, d] = 0, then
(i) for d < 2, and c ∈ [0, c[d; a = 0] ], y*[a, c, d, ] = 0 ∀ a ≥ 0,
(ii) for d < 2 and c  ∈ [c[d; a = 0], 
4 - d
4 + d ), ∃  a* ≡ 
c·d - [1 - c]
2·[1 - c] - c·d ∈ [0, ∞), such
that for a > a*,   y*[a, c, d] =  0, and for a < a*, y*[a, c, d]  is a continuous decreasing
function of a. When a = a*, there are two optimal offers y; at this point y*[·] jumps
from 0 to a positive value.
(iii) for d < 2, and c ∈ [
4 - d
4 + d , 
2
2 + d ), then y*[a, c, d] = 0 for a ≥ a*, while for a
< a*, y*[a, c, d] is a continuous decreasing function of a,
(iv) for d ≥ 2 and c ∈ [0, 
1
1 + d ), y*[a, c, d] = 0, ∀ a,
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(v) for d ≥ 2 and c ∈ [
1
1 + d , 
2
2 + d ), then y*[a, c, d] = 0 for a ≥ a*, while for a <
a*, y*[a, c, d] is a continuous decreasing function of a; where
a* = 
c·d - [1 - c]
2·[1 - c] - c·d , and
(iv) for c ∈ [
2
2 + d , 1], y*[a, c, d] is a continuous decreasing function of a, ∀ a.
The proof uses
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold. Further, suppose d ≥ 2 or d ∈ [0, 2), and
c ∈ [0,  
d·e2-d
8 - d  ] ∪ [
4 - d
4 + d , 1]. If:
a)  Fb[a, 0, c, d] > 0 then y*[a, c, d] > 0 is given by Fb[·] = 0, and
b)  Fb[a, 0, c, d] ≤ 0, then y*[a, c, d] = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1: first,
Fb[a, b, c, d] = gb(a, b)·[1 - c·e-bd] + c·d·g(a, b)·e-bd, and
Fbb[a, b, c, d] = gbb(a, b)·[1 - c·e-bd] + 2·c·d·gb(a, b)·e-bd
                                                                                              - c·d2·g(a, b)·e-bd,
where  g(a, b) =   
10·[1 + a + b]
1 + 2·b  , gb(a, b) =  
-10·[1 + 2·a]
[1 + 2·b]2
 , and
gbb(a, b) =  
40·[1 + 2·a]
[1 + 2·b]3
  . Hence,
Fb[a, b, c, d] = 





10
[1 + 2·b]2
 ·{c·d·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b]·e-bd
- [1 + 2·a]·[1 - c·e-bd]},
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and Fbb[a, b, c, d] = 





10
[1 + 2·b]3
 ·{4·[1 + 2·a]·[1 - c·e-bd]
- 2·c·d·[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b]·e-bd
- c·d2·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b]2·e-bd}.
Notice, for b large enough, Fb[a, b, c, d] < 0.  Second, given Fb[·] = 0, Fbb[·] ≥ 0 iff
c·d·[1 + 2·b]·e-bd·{4·[1 + a + b] - 2·[1 + 2·a] - d·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b]} ≥ 0,
iff
2 - d·[1 + a + b] ≥ 0.
That is, if a + b >  
2 - d
d  , then Fb[·] = 0 yields a local maximum.  Third, Fb[·] = 0 iff
 c = c[a, b, d] =  
[1 + 2·a]·ebd
1 + 2·a + d·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b] .
Further,
 
∂c[·]
∂a   = 
d·[1 + 2·b]2·ebd
{1 + 2·a + d·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b]}2
  > 0, and
∂c[·]
∂b   = 
[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b]·{d·[1 + a + b] - 2}·ebd
{1 + 2·a + d·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b]}2
  < 0,
iff
2 - d·[1 + a + b] > 0.
Hence,
a)  if d > 2, then Fb[·] = 0 yields a global maximum, as 2 - d·[1 + a + b] < 0,
[a, b] ∈ R2+ .
b) if d = 2, Fb[·] = 0 and Fbb[·] ≤ 0 implies a = b = 0, and c = c[a, b, d] = 
1
3 .
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Now, if [a, b] ≠ [0, 0], then  c[a, b, d] > 
1
3 , as c[·] is strictly increasing in both a and b.
Hence, b*[0, 
1
3 , 2] = 0.  Further, if c < 
1
3 , then Fb[a, 0, c, d] < 0, ∀ a ≥ 0, if c ≥  
1
2 , then
Fb[a, 0, c, d] > 0, ∀ a ≥ 0, while if  c ∈ (
1
3 , 
1
2 ), Fb[a, 0, c, d] < 0 if and only if  a >
3·c - 1
2 - 4·c .
c) if d < 2, then for a + b ≤  
2 - d
d  , c[a, b, d] is maximized by setting b = 0, and a =  
2 - d
d
, yielding  c[
2 - d
d  , 0, d] = 
4 - d
4 + d , while c[·] is minimized by setting a = 0 and b =  
2 - d
d  ,
yielding    c[0, 
2 - d
d  , d] = 
d·e2-d
8 - d  .
d) if c ≤ 
1
1 + d , then Fb[a, 0, c, d] ≤ 0, ∀ a ≥ 0. If c ≥ 
2
2 + d , Fb[a, 0, c, d] > 0, ∀ a ≥ 0,
while for  c ∈ (
1
1 + d ,   
2
2 + d ), Fb[a, 0, c, d] < 0 if and only if a >    
c·[1 + d] - 1
2 - c·[2 + d] .
Proof of Proposition 1: first,
         Fba[·] = 





10
[1 + 2·b]2
 ·{c·d·[1 + 2·b]·e-bd - 2·[1 - c·e-bd]}.
Now, Fb[·] = 0 implies that a·{c·d·[1 - 2·b]·e-bd - 2·[1 - c·e-bd]} + c·d·[1 + 2·b]·e-bd -
[1 - c·e-bd] = 0, and so Fba[·] < 0 (for c < 1, and b > 0).  Hence it follows that when the
optimal choice of b, b*[a, c, d], is given by Fb[·] = 0 and Fbb[·] < 0, 
∂b
∂a  < 0.
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All but condition (ii) follow trivially from Lemma 1, combined with the above
observation. Notice, when d = 2, c[d] = 
4 - d
4 + d  = 
1
1 + d . Further, in conditions (iii) and
(v), a* is chosen so as to yield Fb[a*, 0, c, d] = 0.
All that remains to be shown, therefore, is that condition (ii) holds and for this it is
sufficient to show that if G[a] = F[a, 0, c, d] - F[a, b(a), c, d] = 0, then 
dG[a]
da   > 0, where
b(a) > 0 is given by Fb[·] = 0 and Fbb[·] < 0.
Now, G[a] = 10·[1 + a]·[1 - c] - 
10 ⋅[1 + a + b(a)] ⋅[1− c ⋅e− b(a)d ]
1+ 2 ⋅ b(a)
, and so 
dG
da   = 10·[1 - c]
- 
10·[1 - c·e-b(a)d]
1 + 2·b(a)  , (as Fb[·] = 0). It is sufficient, therefore, to show G[a] = 0 implies [1
- c]·[1 + 2·b(a)] > [1 - c·e-b(a)d]. Now, G[a] = 0 yields
[1 + a]·[1 - c]·[1 + 2·b(a)] = [1 + a + b(a)]·[1 - c·e-b(a)d].
Further, as b(a) > 0, it follows that 1 + a + b(a) > 1 + a, and so 
dG[a]
da   > 0, as desired.
That is, starting at a = ∞, as a falls we have b*[a, c, d] = 0, until we come to the critical
value of a for which there are two optimal values for b. Further, such a critical value, if
it exists, is unique, for we always move from b = 0 to b > 0 (as a falls). Hence, for a
below this critical value, b*[a, c, d] > 0 and   
∂b * (a,c, d)
∂a < 0.
ii) Proof of Proposition 2
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Fbc[·] = 





10
[1 + 2·b]2
 ·{d·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b]·e-bd + [1 + 2·a]·e-bd} > 0. Hence, if b(a)
is given by Fb[·] = 0 and Fbb[·] < 0, then ∂b(a)/∂a > 0. It is therefore sufficient to show
that if G[c] = F[a, 0, c, d] - F[a, b(c), c, d] = 0, and b(c) > 0, then 
∂G[c]
∂c    < 0. Now, as
Fb[a, b(c), c, d] = 0,
∂G[c]
∂c   = 
10·[1 + a + b(c)]·e-b(c)d
1 + 2·b(c)   - 10·[1 + a].
Now, G[c] = [c - 1]·[
∂G[c]
∂c  ] +  
10·[1 + a + b(c)]·[e-b(c)d - 1]
1 + 2·b(c)    = 0. Hence, for b(c) > 0
and d > 0, it must be the case that [c - 1]·[
∂G[c]
∂c  ] > 0; 
∂G[c]
∂c    < 0.
iii) Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i):  Consider the point at which c = 
4 - d
4 + d  intersects with Fb[a, 0, c, d] = 0.
These two equalities yield c = 
1 + 2·a
1 + 2·a + d·[1 + a]   = 
4 - d
4 + d , and so d = 
2
1 + a .
Now, consider the locus of points given by F[a, 0, c, d] = F[a, b, c, d], Fb[a, b, c, d] = 0.
Given a, this yields c as an implicit function of d, which intersects the curve, c = 
4 - d
4 + d  
when d = 
2
 1 + a .
Now, it is our claim that for c ∈ (c[d], 
4 - d
4 + d ), some high values of a yield Fb[b] = 0,
for b > 0, even though b*[·] = 0. Where does this turning point come from? (i) It could
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always be there from a = ∞, or (ii) it could come from b = 0, or (iii) from b = ∞, or
finally, (iv) it may emerge from a < ∞ and 0 < b < ∞.
From Lemma 1, Fb[0] = 0 implies Fba[0] < 0. This rules out (ii). Similarly, the
observation that Fb[b] < 0 for b large enough rules out (iii). Hence, either (i) or (iv)
would appear to be true.
Part (ii): Given [a, d], c' is given by Fb[a, 0, c', d] = 0;
c' = 
1 + 2·a
1 + 2·a + d·[1 + a] .
For c > c', Fb[a, 0, c, d] > 0, and so b = 0 is the only local minimum. It is important to
notice that a local minimum requires a local maximum, and so a local minimum (with b
> 0) must emerge from a situation when Fb[·] = Fbb[·] = 0. Now, Fbb[·] = 0 requires 2
= d·[1 + a + b], or b = 
2 − d[1+ a]
d
. Substituting this expression into Fb[·] = 0 yields c"
=  
d·[1 + 2·a]·e2-d·[1+a]
8 - d·[1 + 2·a]  . It is easily verified that if d·[1 + a] < 2, then c" < 1. Further, it
is also the case that c' > c".
To verify c" < 1 consider 8 > g[a, d] = d·[1 + 2·a]·{1 + e2-d·[1+a]} and
∂g
∂d  = [1 + 2·a]·{1 + [1 - d·(1 + a)]·e
2-d·[1+a]} > 0, as 1 + [x - 1]·ex > 0, ∀ x > 0, where
x = 2 - d·[1 + a] > 0. Hence, for any a, g[a, d] is maximized when d·[1 + a] = 2, yielding
g[a, d] = 4 + 2·a·d < 8 (as a·d < 2).
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To verify c' > c", simply notice that Fb[a, 0, c, d] = 0 implies Fbb[a, 0, c, d] < 0 (as d·[1
+ a] < 2), and so for c > c', there is no point b such that Fb[a, b, c, d] = 0 and Fbb[a, b,
c, d] ≥ 0 (Fbb[a, 0, c, d] > 0 implies a unique local maximum). Hence it must be the
case that c' > c".
(iv) Proof of Proposition 4
 Assume, by contradiction, that there are two different local maxima
b1 and b2 contained in (0,∞). Without loss of generality we may assume that b1 < b2 .
As a result there must exist a b3 ∈(b1,b2) at which EU attains a local minimum. Now
on the one hand, according to the necessary and sufficient condition derived in Lemma
1 above, we must have
a+b1 ≥ (2-d)/d.
But because b3 > b1 we must have
a+b3 ≥ (2-d)/d
which implies that b3 is a strict local maximum. A contradiction.
v) Proof of Proposition 5
First we establish Proposition 5’: Given b > 0 and d > 0 satisfying the following
conditions:
(i)    1+ 0.5d(1+ 2b) − ebd < 0.5d, and
(ii)   1+ d(1 + b)(1+ 2b) − ebd ≥  d(1+ b)2,
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there exists a*=a(b,d) ≥ 0, and c* = c(b,d) such that
(a)    F(a*,0,c*, d) =   F(a*, b,c*,d), and
(b)    Fb(a*,b, c*,d),
If, in addition (iii) a *+b > 2-dd  then
(c) {0, b} are the only maxima of F(a*,.,c*,d), and
(d) Given the above c* and d, as a increases from zero to a* the optimal offer
remains unique and decreases to b at a=a* where it has two values {0, b}. As a
increases above a=a* the optimal offer remains uniquely 0.
Let
c = c(a,b,d) =
(1+ 2a)ebd
1+ 2a + d(1+ a + b)(1+ 2b)
and 
G(a) = 10(1+ a)[1− c(a,b,d)]−
10(1+ a + b)(1- c(a,b,d)e-bd)
(1+ 2b)
.
It is easy to verify that (i) of the proposition implies that G(∞) < 0; and that (ii) implies
that G(0) ≥ 0. Hence, there exists a* ≥ 0 such that G(a*) = 0, which is equivalent to part
(a) of the proposition if we write c(a*,b,d)=c*=c*(b,d). Part (b) follows directly from
the definition of c(a,b,d).
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Now, if (iii) is satisfied, then b is a local maximum of F(a*,.,c*,d). Part (c) follows
from the Corollary. Conclusion (d) follows from arguments that establish the previous
propositions.
Now let b1 = b1(d) be the implicit function solved from 1 + 0.5d(1+ 2b) - e
bd
= 0.5d
and b2 = b2(d) be the implicit function solved from
1 + d(1+ b)(1 + 2b) - ebd = d(1+ b)2 .  It is the case that b1(d) < b2 (d). In addition, let
c1(d) = c *[b1(d),d],  and c2(d) = c * [b2(d),d],  then c1(d) > c2(d) for any  b >
2 − d
d .
These statements mean that Proposition 5’ can be expressed as
Proposition 5: Given any d < 2 and  c ∈(c2(d),c1(d))there exists an a*=a*(c,d), such
that  F(a*,.,c,d) has precisely two global maxima {0,b>0}.
iv) Proof of Proposition 6.
The first-order condition yields:
Fb[a, b, c, d, q] = c·d·U[g(a, b), q]·e-bd + gb(a, b)·U1[g(a, b), q]·[1 - c·e-bd].
Now, Fb[a, 0, c, d, q] = c·d·U[10·(1 + a), q] - 10·(1 + 2·a)·(1 - c)·U1[10·(1 + a), q],
which will be positive for c close enough to 1 (given a, d, and q), while for b large
enough, Fb[a, b, c, d, q] < 0 (as bn·e-bd → 0 as b → ∞, for n positive and finite).
Hence, if it can be shown that Fb[a, b, c, d, q] = 0 implies Fbb[a, b, c, d, q] < 0, then
there exists a unique optimal value of b; b*[a, c, d, q]. Notice, if Fb[a, 0, c, d q] ≥ 0, the
first-order condition yields b*[·], while Fb[a, 0, c, d, q] < 0 implies b*[·] = 0.
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Lemma 2: If c >  
4 - d
4 + d , then Fb[a, b, c, d, q] = 0 implies Fbb[a, b, c, d, q] < 0.
Hence, a unique optimal value of b > 0 - written b*[a, c, d, q] - exists.
Proof of Lemma 2: given (a, c, d, q), suppose ∃ b* such that Fb[a, b*, c, d, q] = 0. Now,
          Fbb[a, b*, c, d, q] = [gb(a, b*)]2·U11[g(a, b*), q]·[1 - c·e-b*d]
     + U1[g(a, b*), q]·{d·gb(a, b*)·[1 + c·e-b*d]
                + gbb(a, b*)·[1 - c·e-b*d]} < 0
if  d·gb(a, b*)·[1 + c·e-b*d] + gbb(a, b*)·[1 - c·e-b*d] < 0 (as U1[·] > 0).
Notice, this condition is sufficient but not necessary, as it ignores the first term, [gb(a,
b*)]2·U11[g(a, b*), q]·[1 - c·e-b*d], which is clearly negative (if U11[·] = 0, then the
condition also becomes necessary). Now,
d·gb(a, b*)·[1 + c·e-b*d] + gbb(a, b*)·[1 - c·e-b*d]
= 10·[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b*]-3·{4·[1 - c·e-b*d]
- d·[1 + 2·b*]·[1 + c·e-b*d]} < 0
iff
             4 < 4·c·e-b*d + d·[1 + 2·b*]·[1 + c·e-b*d]
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                                    = d·(1 + 2·b*) + c·[4 + d·(1 + 2·b*)]·e-b*d.                    (A1)
Treating the RHS as a function of b*, the second-derivative is strictly positive ∀ b*,
while the first-derivative is positive for b* large enough. Two possibilities therefore
emerge; either (i) the derivative at b* = 0 is negative - in which case the RHS of (A1) is
minimized when b* = b' > 0, and 2 = c·[2 + d·(1 + 2·b')]·e-b'd; or (ii) the derivative at
b* = 0 is non-negative - in which case the RHS of (A1) is minimized when b* = 0.
(i) If c·(2 + d) > 2, then ∃ b' > 0 such that 2 = c·[2 + d·(1 + 2·b')]·e-b'd, and so
the RHS of (A1) becomes d·(1 + 2·b') + 2·[4 + d·(1 + 2·b')]·[2 + d·(1 + 2·b')]-1 = d·(1 +
2·b') + 2 + 4·[2 + d·(1 + 2·b')]-1 > 4 if, and only if, 4 > [2 + d·(1 + 2·b')]·[2 - d·(1 + 2·b')]
= 4 - [d·(1 + 2·b')]2, which is always true. Hence, Fbb[a, b*, c, d, q] < 0.
(ii) If c·(2 + d) ≤ 2, the RHS of (A1) is minimized when b' = 0 - as the RHS of
(A1) is an increasing function of b, ∀ b > 0. When b = 0, (A1) becomes 4 < d + c·(4 +
d), which is true if, and only if, d >   
4·[1 - c]
1 + c  .
Notice, 
2·[1 - c]
c   > 
4·[1 - c]
 1 + c  , ∀ c ∈ (0, 1), and so if d >   
4·[1 - c]
1 + c  , then Fb[a, b*, c, d, q]
= 0 implies Fbb[a, b*, c, d, q] < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6: it uses Lemma 2 and
ga(a, b) =  
20
1 + 2·b , gb(a, b) =  
-10·[1 + 2·a]
[1 + 2·b]2
 , gaa(a, b) = 0,
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gab(a, b) = gba(a, b) = 
-20
[1 + 2·b]2
 ,  and gbb(a, b) =  
40·[1 + 2·a]
[1 + 2·b]3
  .
Turning to the proof, either (i) Fb[a, 0, c, d, q] < 0 - yielding b*[a, c, d, q] = 0 - or (ii)
Fb[a, 0, c, d, q] ≥ 0 - and so b*[a, c, d, q] is given by Fb[a, b*, c, d, q] = 0.
(i) As Fb[·] is C1, if Fb[a, 0, c, d, q] < 0, this inequality will be maintained for
an open neighborhood of [a, c, d, q]. Hence, b*[a', c', d', q'] = 0, ∀ [a', c', d', q'] in the
neighborhood. It is therefore trivially established that b*[·] is non-increasing in a and q,
and non-decreasing in c (and d).
(ii) From Lemma 2 Fb[a, 0, c, d, q] = 0 ensures Fbb[a, b*, c, d, q] < 0,  and
hence it is sufficient to show Fba[a, b*, c, d, q] < 0, Fbq[a, b*, c, d, q] < 0, and Fbc[a,
b*, c, d, q] > 0.
Fba[a, b*, c, d, q] = c·d·ga(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b*), q]·e-b*d
  + [1 - c·e-b*d]·{ga(a, b*)·gb(a, b*)·U11[g(a, b), q]
  + gba(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b), q]} < 0
iff
  U[g(a, b*), q]·{gb(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b*), q]}-1·{ga(a, b*)· gb(a, b*)·U11[g(a, b*), q]
+ gba(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b*), q]} - ga(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b*), q]  > 0
iff,
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  ga(a, b*)·gb(a, b*)·{U1[g(a, b*), q]2 - U11[g(a, b*), q]·U[g(a, b*), q]} >
gba(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b*), q]·U[g(a, b*), q]
iff,
 ga(a, b*)·gb(a, b*)·gba(a, b*)-1·{U1[g(a, b*), q]2 - U11[g(a, b*), q]·U[g(a, b*), q]}
< U1[g(a, b*), q]·U[g(a, b*), q].
Finally, ga(a, b*)·gb(a, b*)·gba(a, b*)-1 = g(a, b*) - 5, and so Assumption 4(iii) ensures
Fba[a, b*, c, d, q] < 0.
Now, if Fb[a, b*, c, d, q] = 0, then
       [c·d]-1·gb(a, b*)·[1 - c·e-b*d]·eb*d = -U[g(a, b*), q]·U1[g(a, b*), q]-1.
This ensures
Fbq[a, b*, c, d, q] = c·d·U2[g(a, b*), q]·e-b*d + gb(a, b*)·U12[g(a, b*), q]·[1
- c·e-b*d] < 0
iff
U1[g(a, b*), q]·U2[g(a, b*), q] - U12[g(a, b*), q]·U[g(a, b*), q] < 0,
which is guaranteed from Assumption 4(iv). Finally
Fbc[a, b*, c, d, q] = d·U[g(a, b*), q]·e-b*d - gb(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b*), q]·e-b*d
      = c-1·Fb[a, b*, c, d, q] - c-1·gb(a, b*)·U1[g(a, b*), q] > 0.
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Appendix 2: Information and the Ultimatum Game Under Risk Neutrality
First, let us generalize the ultimatum game by letting the size of the pie be A. In the
world of complete information and risk neutrality, if player 1 offers
y ≥ A·b·[1 + 2·b]-1,
Player 2 (with parameter, b) will accept, while y < A·b·[1 + 2·b]-1 will result in
rejection. Hence, Player 1 chooses b so as to maximize their expected utility:
EU1 = {x + a·[x - y]}·[1 - c·e-db] = A·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2b]-1·[1 - c·e-db]
An unknown value for A.
Treat A as a random variable, p[A] = prob A, A* = ∑A p[A]·A, x(A) = A - y, and so
U2[A] = y + b·[2·y - A] = [1 + 2·b]·y - b·A .
I Common information.
Both players know the distribution of A, but no-one knows the realized value (until the
game is over). The offer made by Player 1 therefore reveals nothing about the size of A,
and both players know this.
    EU2 = ∑A p[A]·{[1 + 2·b]·y - b·A} = [1 + 2·b]·y - b·∑A p[A]·A
           = [1 + 2·b]·y - b·A*.
Given y = A*·b·[1 + 2·b]-1, then x[A] = A - A*·b·[1 + 2·b]-1,
x[A] - y = A - 2·A*·b·[1 + 2·b]-1,
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U1[A] = x[A] + a·[x(A) - y] = A·[1 + a] - A*·b·[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b]-1
∑A p[A]·U1[A]     = ∑A p[A]·A·[1 + a] - A*·b·[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b]-1
     = A*·[1 + a] - A*·b·[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b]-1
     = A*·[1 + a + b]·[1 + 2·b]-1.
This is the simplest case, where the choice of y is consistent with the support of A. Put
another way, Player 1 is restricted to y ≤ A- (the minimum value of A in the support).
II Private Information but no updating.
Consider now the case where Player 1 is told A, but must still choose y ≤ A-. Further,
Player 2 does not use 1’s offer to update her beliefs about A.
Player 1 seeks to maximize
F = {A·[1 + a] - A*·b·[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b]-1}·[1 - c·e-db]
DbF  = A·[1 + a]·c·d·e-db*
- A*·[1 + 2·a]·[1 + 2·b]-2·{1 - [1 - (1 + 2·b)·b·d]·c·e-db* }
Further, given a, A, and y > 0, if A* is lowered, then y will fall and y·[A*]-1 will rise.
Notice, this result is consistent with Croson (1996). In that paper A* = A = 10 yields y
= 4.5 and y·[A*]-1 = 45% (on average), while A* = 7.46 yields y = 3.57 and y·[A*]-1 =
48%.
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Notice, this section assumes all Players have the same prior (A*), which is clearly not
the case in Croson’s (1996) experiment; there is a distribution of priors for respondents,
and proposers must form a belief about these priors.
III Private Information with the choice of revelation.
Player 1 observes A. She has the option to reveal this value to Player 2 (when she
announces y). Notice, she does not announce a size of the pie, A^, for this
announcement could be a lie. Rather she presses a button that reveals the true value of
A. Player 1 must therefore choose between telling the truth and remaining silent.
Now, from game II, if Player 1 observes A < A*, then she can increase the probability
that 2 will accept a given offer, y, by revealing A. That is, Player 2 replaces A* with A
and this will lower the critical value of b associated with 2 accepting the offer, y.
Hence, if A < A*, Player 1 reveals A (no matter what her offer, y, is), while if A ≥ A*,
Player 1 remains silent.
But now, Player 2 knows that silence implies A ≥ A*; silence generates a conditional
probability distribution over A, with mean greater than A*. If Player 1 observes a value
of A less than this conditional mean, she will choose to reveal.
This process continues until we reach the point where Player 1 reveals, except when A
is at its maximum value (silence means A is at its maximum, and so it is equivalent to
Player 1 always revealing). We are now back in the game where the size of the pie, A,
is common knowledge. Notice, the key assumption required to generate this result was
that Player 1 had access to a revelation technology - rather than an announcement
technology.
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IV Private Information with updating.
Player 1 announces y. Now, there are two pieces of private information that influence
the offer; a and A. Player 2 is therefore able to form a conditional probability for A, as a
function of y.
Let us consider the simplest case, where attention is restricted to two values for A, A1
and A2, and two possible values for y; 0 and y*.  Restricting the strategy set to this
extent facilitates a sharp focus on updating by Player 2. The probability of A1 occurring
is p.
Let p[y] be the probability of A1 being true, given y.  If y = 0, let
A[0] = p[0]·A1 + [1 - p(0)]·A2.
Similarly, A[y*] = p[y*]·A1 + [1 - p(y*)]·A2.
If  y = 0, then Player 2 accepts if b = 0, and rejects otherwise. Player 1 receives
[1 + a]·A·[1 - c].
If  y = y*, Player 2 will accept if b ≤ y*·{A[y*] - 2·y*}-1, and so Player 1 receives
{[1 + a]·A - [1 + 2·a]·y*}·H{y*·[A(y*) - 2·y*]-1}.
We then have a1 = a[A1, A(y*)], and a2 = a[A2, A(y*)]. If Player 1 observes A1, then y*
will be offered iff a < a1. If, however, Player 1 observes A2, then y* will be offered iff a
< a2.
The probability of y* being announced is:
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p·H[a1] + [1 - p]·H[a2].
Hence:
p[y*] = p·H[a1]·{p·H[a1] + [1 - p]·H[a2]}-1.
This yields the equilibrium conditions for [a1, a2, A(y*), p(y*)]:
[1] A[y*] = p[y*]·A1 + [1 - p(y*)]·A2.
[2]  [1 + a1]·A1·[1 - c] = {[1 + a1]·A1 - [1 + 2·a1]·y*}·{1 - c·e-dy*/[A(y*) - 2·y*]}.
[3] [1 + a2]·A2·[1 - c] = {[1 + a2]·A2 - [1 + 2·a2]·y*}·{1 - c·e-dy*/[A(y*) - 2·y*]}.
[4]  p[y*] = p·H[a1]·{p·H[a1] + [1 - p]·H[a2]}-1.
An example c = 0.59, d = 0.5, A1 = 10, A2 = 12, p = 0.9 (A* = 10.2). Consider a
situation in which y* = 4.7. Two equilibria emerge.
First, a1 = 0.285358, a2 = 0.874091, p[y*] = 0.87659, A[y*] = 10.2468. The probability
that Player 1 announces y = 0 is p[0] = 0.498505, while the population proportion that
accepts 1’s offer is 0.687436 (notice, this is the unconditional acceptance; the
conditional acceptance for y = 0 is [1 - c]).
Second, a1 = 0, a2 = 0.216105, p[y*] = 0, A[y*] = 12. When Player 1 observes A1, she
always offers y = 0. This behavior is common knowledge, and so when Player 2
observes y = y*, she knows Player 1 has observed A2. Further p[0] = 0.952957, while
the population proportion that accepts 1’s offer is 0.426514. Finally, given p[y*] and
A[y*], consistency requires that when Player 1 observes A1, she prefers to offer y = 0,
rather than y = y* (irrespective of her utility coefficient, a). Notice, the intuition here is
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that if Player 2 receives an offer of y = y*, she infers that A = A2, and so there is a high
probability she will reject the offer. This discourages Player 1 from offering y = y*.
The set of examples of multiple equilibria is likely to  reduce as the strategy set is
enlarged.
V Private Information with updating: a mean preserving spread.
Here we focus on the first type of equilibrium discussed above; where A[y*] < A2. The
implications of increasing the variance of A (with the mean constant) are ambiguous.
[1] If A1 and A* are fixed (with p and A2 adjusting to change the variance and preserve
the mean), an increase in p causes A2 to rise and Var to also rise. The prob that Player 1
offers 0 rises, while 2’s acceptance - of 0 - remains fixed at [1 - c].
This would seem to be consistent with the claim; the greater the uncertainty, the
smaller the offer.
In the examples we have considered, with p and A2 rising, we observe A[y] rising, a1
falling (when 1 observes A1, the prob of her offering zero rises), a2 rises (as A2 is rising,
the prob of 1 offering zero is falling), while the overall prob that Player 1 offers zero is
rising.
[2] If p and A1 adjust, then a reduction in p (and a decrease in A1), causes the variance
to rise. The prob that Player 1 offers 0 now falls.
In the examples, as p and A1 both fall, we observe A[y] rising, a1 and a2 falling (the
prob of offering zero rises, whether Player observes A1 or A2). However, the overall
prob that Player 1 offers zero is falling. This paradoxical result is due to the direct
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impact of p falling. As p falls there is a switch from the “high prob of zero” pie (A1), to
the “low prob of zero” pie (A2). In our examples this effect dominates all else.
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Figure 1
Player 1
y = 0 y = 10
Player 2
Yes No NoYes
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
Expected Utility Under Risk Neutrality
(a = 0.8227, c = 0.6776,  d = 0.5)
Figure 2
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Figure 3
Expected Utility and the Optimal Offer
EU(a=0.0, c ∈ (0.3, 0.7), y ∈ (0.0, 4.8), d=1.0)
                           
Figure 3: q=0.2
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Figure 4
Figure 4: q=0.5
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Figure 5
 Figure 5: q=0.8
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Figure 6
The Optimal Offer and Player 1’s Expected Utility
Under Increasing Strength of Network Relationships
(a = 0.0, c = 0.7,  d = 0.5, y ∈ (0.0, 4.9), z =  (6,8,10))
Figure 6 11
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Footnotes
1 If  Player 1 assigns a probability, p > 0, for Player 2 rejecting an offer of y = 0, a
(unique) subgame perfect equilibrium exists only if it is assumed that money has a
smallest unit, ε; yielding an equilibrium {y = ε, yes}.
2 An implication of Assumption 4(iv) is that ∂U/∂W).(W/U) <
[∂(∂U/∂q)/∂W].(W/(∂U/∂q)) which is a restriction that bounds the elasticity of utility
with respect to wealth by the elasticity of the marginal utility of the degree of risk
aversion with respect to wealth. Clearly 4(iv) requires Uwq > 0.
3 Formally, we have not shown that the offer is monotonically increasing in c for all
values of {c, d} given a.
4 The information structure does differ in that Croson op cit does no have a common
knowledge prior for the distribution of the size of the pie.
5 In fact, the approach of Straub and Murnighan (1995) does not fit precisely the case 5
specification in that the distribution of the total pie was not common knowledge to the
participants.
6 It might be considered that a mean preserving spread in the preference parameter
indicates an increase in heterogeneity among responders. But because a mean
preserving spread necessarily means an increased proportion of reponders with a zero
preference parameter, this interpretation is not applicable.
7 Throughout this discussion we presume that players of the dictator game in
experiments were not confused about the nature of the game. We recognize that
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experimenters went to some trouble to rule this out, and indeed the changed outcomes
under complete anonymity is suggestive that they were successful.
8 In an experiment where social distance is large - i.e. the questionnaire is such that the
decisionmaker is encouraged to feel quite “unrelated” to the other player - a bi-modal
distribution is again obtained.
9 Eckel and Grossman (1996) report experimental findings in which respondent’s that
were represented as charities received larger offers. In addition to explanations that rest
on perceptions of a “deserving” respondent, these results may be explained by
reputation implications and possibilities of future contact or requirements. The latter
explanations entail expectations.
10 Formally, the players need not be specifically identified with each other: all that is
required is knowledge that one was the proposer and the other the responder in the
same experimental dictator game in the past.
11 The intersections of the graphs with the vertical axis are increasing in z.
